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JOINT MEMORANDUM

REVISED CIA/DIA ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA

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
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
Revised CIA/DIA Estimates of Warsaw Pact Manpower in the NATO Guidelines Area

- 2. We have increased our estimate of overall Pact manpower in the NGA from 1,040,000 to some 1,130,000. (See Table 1). The ground forces total is increased slightly from 925,000 to an estimated 927,000 and the air forces from 112,000 to about 202,000. All of the changes on Table 1 result from higher estimates of air forces and national air defense forces and from redefinition of certain categories of forces. A notable example occurs with the apparent decrease in East German ground forces of about 10,000 men. This results from a determination that East German SAM troops and other ground-based national air defense elements should be counted with the air force total rather than the ground force total.

This memorandum was produced jointly by the CIA Office of Strategic Research and the DIA Soviet/Warsaw Pact Area Division. It is issued as part of a continuing CIA/DIA effort to improve the data base on Warsaw Pact manpower in support of the MBFR negotiations.

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED







Increased Estimates for Air Force and National Air Defense Personnel

3. The changed estimates of Pact air and air defense force personnel in NGA result from new information and refinements in the estimative analysis which now accounts for personnel involved in rear services overhead type activity. These revised estimates account for all of the changes reflected in Table 1.

4. The new information serves two purposes. First
it helps to dispel the conventional belief that the Pact
can support large air and air defense forces with an
extremely low ratio of support to combat personnel.

Ground Force Manpower Estimate

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6. The 2,000 increase in the estimate of ground force personnel is a result of revised estimates of ground elements of national air defense forces. Otherwise, we have no basis for changing our current estimate of Warsaw Pact ground forces manpower. It should be pointed out that for MBFR purposes estimates of Pact military manpower do not include personnel in internal security and border guard functions. In the NGA these paramilitary forces comprise about 120,000 to 175,000 indigenous personnel. Some elements of these forces are equipped with tanks and armored personnel carriers and possess combat capability approaching that of regular ground forces.





Warsaw Pact Military Manpower in NGA 1/

	New E	ew Estimate		Previou	Previous Estimate	
	Ground Forces	Air Forces	Total	Ground Forces	Air Forces	Total
Soviet:						
GSFG	360,000	40,800	400,800	360,000	36,500	396,500
CGF	70,000	5,600	75,600	30,000 70,000	5,000	45,000 75,000
Total*	460,000	60,100	520,000	460,000	56,500	517,000
Indigenous						
East Germany	90,400 2/	38,300	128,700	100,000	12,000	112,000
Poland		60,500	279,600	210,000	25,000	235,000
Czechoslovakia Total*		42,900 142,000	200,800	155,000 465,000	18,000	173,000 520,000
Total NGA*	927,000	202,000 1	1,130,000	925,000	112,000 1	1,040,000

air defense personnel. Does not include naval personnel, personnel in reserves, ter-ritorial defense forces, or other paramilitary organizations. Does not include elements of the Air and Air Defense Command which are shown in East German Includes all uniformed Pact military personnel on active duty in NGA, including national

These totals have been rounded to three significant digits.



Air Force total. ∾ ∾

Includes SAM, AAA and some radar personnel of the respective air defense commands. 3



Confidence Factor in the Revised Estimates

- 7. As a result of the new information and improved methodologies our confidence in the accuracy of the new estimates of Pact military personnel in the NGA is higher than that held in the old estimates.
- In percentage terms, confidence in the estimates of personnel involved in operational or direct support activity is high--the estimate is not expected to vary from the actual by more than ten percent. Confidence in estimates of personnel involved in headquarters, rear services, and army and front level support vary from 15 to 25 percent depending on the force element involved. The greatest area of uncertainty continues to be the number of personnel in such national overhead elements as defense ministries, military academies and schools, and various administrative, medical, and central support units. Estimates of these overhead elements we assign a confidence level of +-25%. These levels of uncertainty apply even in those cases where reliable aggregate information is available, because of the remaining uncertainty concerning the composition of the various sub-elements of the respective forces.
- 9. Considering the varying confidence levels attaching to the manpower estimates in these categories of military activity and their respective impact on the total figures for the indigenous East European forces in NGA, the totals shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are confidently judged to be within 15 percent of the actual current numbers. Because the Soviet forces stationed in NGA do not include a large overhead establishment, the Soviet total can be confidently judged to be within ten percent of actual.

The Problem of Categorization by Uniform Service

- 10. The data presented in Table 1 are organized to fit into a two-service mold to ease comparison with NATO concepts of uniform service.
- ll. Generally speaking, the distinctions drawn between uniform services in Pact military forces are not as sharply drawn as in US forces. This complicates the intelligence task of estimating personnel by service.



Moreover, the service responsibility for certain functions—notably tactical air support and tactical and strategic air defense—varies from country to country both in the Pact and NATO.

- 12. The most serious problem of interpretation raised by the two-service format relates to those personnel involved in national air defense. Table 2 below presents the numbers of personnel estimated to be involved in national air defense in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and indicates how these personnel are counted in the totals given in Table 1. The national air defense personnel in Poland and Czechoslovakia are organized in a distinct command. Accordingly the two-service breakdown is misleading, and may not be acceptable to the Pact negotiators.
- 13. In any case, the breakdown of Pact personnel by uniform service cannot be estimated with confidence. The arbitrary division of the various sub-elements of national air defense by uniform service are, for the most part, not supported by good intelligence information.
- 14. An alternative presentation of the data which would facilitate functional comparisons with NATO and avoid the estimative uncertainties inherent in the two-category uniformed service format is shown in table 3.
- 15. Such a format, which focuses on the <u>functions</u> of personnel would require rigorous definition of the main functional categories, but would be more flexible (the number of categories could be expanded), more easily understood by both NATO and Pact negotiators and more confidently supported by US intelligence.

Issues and Alternatives for Presenting the New Data to the Allies

16. The new US estimates of Pact ground force and air forces strengths should not cause serious problems with the Allies. The difference in the ground force figure is so small (0.3%) that it may not be worth raising at this time if we continue to use the current




Table 2

Indigenous Warsaw Pact National Air Defense Manpower

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NAD Personnel Listed in Table 1 as Ground Force	26,700	14,900		41,600	
NAD Personnel Listed in Table l as Air Force	18,500	10,800	$\frac{22,100}{1}$	51,400	
National Air Defense	45,200	25,700	22,100	93,000	
Country	Poland	CSSR	East Germany		

All national air defense personnel in East Germany are in the East German Air and Air Defense Command and, as such, they are considered to be Air Force in the two-service categorization.



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Warsaw Pact Military Manpower in NGA Alternative Functional Categorization

-	Ground Forces	National Air Defense	Air Forces	Totals
·	360,000 30,000 70,000	N/A N/A N/A	40,800 13,700 5,600	400,800 43,700 75,600
Total*	460,000	N/A	60,100	520,000
East Germany Poland CSSR	90,400 192,400 143,000	22,100 45,200 25,700	16,200 42,000 32,100	128,700 279,600 200,800
Total*	426,000	93,000	90,300	000,609
Total Pact *	886,000	93,000	150,000	1,130,000

These totals have been rounded to three significant figures.



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data categories with the Allies and the East. The new air force totals present a greater problem because of the large increase. However, the new US number (202,000) is considerably closer to the 180,000 man estimate which the FRG has recently disclosed than was our previous estimate of 111,500. In any case, we have developed rationales and estimating methods which can be used to support the new estimates in detail without disclosure of sensitive information.

- 17. The main advantage of the functional force categories described in paragraphs 14-15 is that they compare more closely with the categories used in the Pact and are therefore susceptible to more confident intelligence analysis. They are likely to be better understood by the East than would our present categories. But the Allies are not accustomed to thinking of forces in these categories—although Allied intelligence specialists will recognize them—and may resist them. Also, it must be noted that the Pact negotiators have not raised the issue, perhaps because they realize that the current categories tend to encourage undercounting Pact manpower.
- 18. We believe that before any decision could be made on adopting new categories some further analysis of US and Allied forces along functional lines would be necessary. It is not presently clear how the NATO/Pact force ratios would fall out.

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